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Abstract 
In the last three decades, the organisation of production has undergone a major transformation from 
vertical integration towards de-verticalisation, with associated increases in outsourcing and the 
international fragmentation of production into global value chains (GVCs). 
Among the most important consequences of GVCs are the creation of new opportunities for 
developing countries to participate in international markets and cross-border business networks, and 
the development of new contractual practices and new models of collaboration among firms, including 
network forms of organization. 
This paper examines these two aspects of GVCs through a case study of the commercial 
aircraft industry in Brazil.  First, I provide an analysis of the role of multilateral contractual networks 
as an instrument to promote developing countries’ small and medium enterprises (SMEs) access to 
GVCs, and increase the benefits derived.  Second, I examine the lack of the proper legal tools in Brazil 
to regulate the different forms of inter-firm collaboration that exist within multilateral contractual 
networks. 
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I. Introduction 
 
I.1.  The Recent Trends of International Production Organisation 
The organization of global production has undergone major transformations over the past few decades. 
This raises the first-order question of what determines industrial organization.  Transaction costs 
theory, developed mainly as an extension of the work of Ronald Coase by Oliver Williamson, posits 
two ways of organising production: through market relations or within vertically-integrated firms. In 
other words, economic activity can be organized through “markets” or “hierarchies”. According to this 
theory, when transactions involve uncertainty about their outcome, occur frequently and require high 
transaction-specific investments (of money, equipment, time, or energy), the risk of opportunism 
drives the parties of a supply-chain away from contracts (the market) and towards vertical integration 
(hierarchy).1 
This was, in fact, what actually occurred for much of the twentieth century, which saw a 
strong tendency towards vertical integration in the main industries (such as automobiles, electrical 
machinery, food processing and aeronautics). Alfred Chandler has a broader view, that highly 
integrated firms were considered the most effective way of reaping the benefits of administrative co-
ordination, economies of scale and speed, risk reduction, and access to larger and distant geographic 
markets.2 
In the last three decades, however, things have changed considerably, and production 
organisation has being moving away from vertical integration towards a de-verticalisation, or vertical 
disintegration, at both domestic and transnational level. 
This trend has been the object of study not only for many economists, but also for social 
scientists and lawyers, who have focused on different reasons for the drivers of disintegration, 
including contemporary technological and political changes.3 Nevertheless, as Gilson et al. argue, 
current business practices have led to a decrease in the proportion of economic activity co-ordinated 
within firms, and a corresponding increase in the proportion of economic activity conducted through 
contract in the market, not only within the traditional market contractual relation, but also within new 
forms of collaborative contractual practices, which go beyond the reach of the existing contract theory 
models.4 
Companies that were once vertically integrated began to: (i) re-define their core competencies, 
focusing upon strengthening them and keeping them within the boundaries of the firm, 5 and (ii) 
                                                      
1 See O. Williamson, The Economic Institutions of Capitalism, New York, Free Press, 1985; O. Williamson, Markets and 
Hierarchies: Analysis and Antitrust Implications, New York, Free Press, 1975; O. Williamson, ‘Transaction-cost 
economics: The governance of contractual relations’, Journal of Law and Economics, 22 (1979) pp. 233-61. Also in W. 
Powell, ‘Neither market nor hierarchy: network forms of organization’, Research in Organizational Behaviour 12 (1990)  
pp. 295-336; R. Gilson; C. Sabel & R. Scott, ‘Contracting for Innovation: Vertical Disintegration and Interfirm 
Collaboration’, Columbia Law Review, 109 (2009) pp. 431-502. 
2 See R. Gilson, C. Sabel & R. Scott, op. cit, p. 437 and W. Powell, op. cit. p. 298. 
3 See F. Cafaggi, “Contractual Networks, Vertical Disintegration and Inter-firm Cooperation” in F. Cafaggi (ed) Contractual 
Networks, Inter-Firm Cooperation and Economic Growth, Cheltenham, Edward Elgar, 2011; G. Gilson et al, op. cit.; 
W.W. Powell, op. cit. and also R. Feenstra, ‘Integration of Trade and Disintegration of Production in the Global 
Economy’, Journal of Economic Perspectives, 12 (1998) pp. 31-50.  
4 R. Gilson, C. Sabel, R. Scott, op. cit. p. 434. As affirmed also by Powell, “One route leads firms to a rediscovery of the 
market, to the hostile world of arms-length relationships. Associated with a greater reliance on external contracts are 
strong efforts at cost-cutting, and greater managerial freedom in the deployment of resources and personnel. Another 
route leads firms to try to reorganize production, not so much through eliminating jobs, but by searching for new methods 
of collaboration among formerly antagonistic and/or competitive parties (Walton, 1985, Weitzman, 1984). Both 
responses entail some form of vertical disaggregation, or the shrinking of large corporate hierarchies.” W. Powell, op. cit. 
pp. 319-320.  
5 According to Niosi and Zhegu, “From these firm’s strategic point of view, focalisation on these core activities corresponded 
to divestment from their ancillary and peripheral business, the merger and acquisition of other firms being presumed to 
reinforce the firm’s core capabilities and the finding of reliable subcontractors for the outsourcing of non-core but still 
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reduce their direct ownership over the “non-core”, or peripheral, activities, outsourcing them, both 
domestically, and, for the most part, abroad.6 In fact, according to Gereffi et al., the globalisation of 
production and trade, together with vertical dis-integration, constitute two of the most important new 
features of the contemporary economy.7 
As already mentioned, this process has been followed by many industries, especially those 
working with complex product systems, which are intensive in capital, engineering and information 
technology.8 This was, in fact, precisely the case for the dominant companies of the commercial 
aircraft sector. 
 
I.2.  The Re-structuring of Production Organisation in the Commercial Aircraft Industry 
In the last 30 years, the most important companies of the commercial aircraft industries (i.e., Boeing, 
Airbus, and Embraer and Bombardier) have passed through a complete re-structuring of their 
organisation of production, which has been characterised by vertical disintegration, outsourcing, and 
the internationalisation of production. 
After a long period, marked by strong concentration within lead firms, the main aircraft 
producers have significantly changed their production strategy. 9 They have started to focus on their 
core competencies (such as design, development and system integration) while outsourcing worldwide 
their non-core activities and sub-systems.10 
In the aircraft industry, this re-structuring has also led to a re-organisation of the supply chain, 
with a reduction in the number of suppliers (from one-too-many to one-too-few) and the development 
of stronger ties to the remaining ones, also with new forms of collaborative contractual agreements; 
i.e., in a risk-sharing partnership. This strategy has had a cascade effect, making first-tier suppliers 
concentrate on their own core business and establish their own supply chains, outsourcing, in turn, 
their non-core activities to second-tier suppliers worldwide.11  As a result, many transactions that used 
to take place within firms, started to be supplied by other firms, or organised by agreements between 
firms.12 
Among the drivers of this process are the liberalisation and privatisation of the air 
transportation industry, and the decrease in government support and public investment,13 which led to 
(Contd.)                                                                    
closely related business”, J. Niosi, H. Zhegu. ‘Multinational Corporations, Value Chains and Knowledge Spillovers in the 
Global Aircraft Industry’, International Journal of Institutions and Economies, 18(2) (2010) pp. 109-141. 
6 G. Gereffi, J. Humphrey, T. Sturgeon, ‘The governance of global value chains’, Review of International Political Economy 
12 (1) (2005) pp. 78-104 at p. 79. See also R.C. Feenstra, op. cit. p.31. 
7 G. Gereffi, J. Humphrey, T. Sturgeon, op. cit. pp. 78-79. 
8 J. Niosi, H. Zhegu, op. cit. p. 118; R. Quadros et al., ‘Mapeamento da Cadeia Produtiva Aeronáutica Brasileira’, in G. C. F. 
Montoro; M. Migon, (org.), Cadeia Produtiva Aeronáutica Brasileira: oportunidades e desafios, Rio de Janeiro: 
BNDES, 2009, p. 76. 
9 Concentration is one of the main characteristics of the aircraft sector, and has been a continuous process both in the civil 
and military industry. Aircraft manufacturers, in fact, must have a powerful economy of scale and scope to meet the high 
costs of R&D, design, assembly, marketing, upgrading, and also to survive the cyclical downturns of the industry. 
10 J. Niosi; H. Zhegu, op. cit. p. 118. 
11 J. Niosi, H. Zhegu, op. cit. pp. 118-119. The Brazilian Embraer followed this process after the liberalization period and its 
privatization, as did the European companies in the nineties. Embraer created three levels of collaboration along the 
supply chain: risk partners, suppliers and subcontractors. UNCTAD, Transfer of Technology for Successful Integration 
into the Global Economy, Geneva and New York, United Nations, 2003, p. 50.  
12 R. Gilson, C. Sabel, R. Scott, op. cit. p. 436. 
13 The liberalisation and privatisation of the air transportation industry has increased fragmentation and deverticalisation of 
supply chains. In the US, for example, the deregulation started in 1978, increasing the competition of the airline 
companies, and making them more cost aware, a concern later transferred to the aircraft manufacturers. T. Horng, ‘A 
comparative Analysis of Supply Chain Management Practices by Boeing and Airbus: Long-term Strategic Implications’, 
Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 2007, pp. 28-29. 
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rationalisation and cost reduction.14 In fact, within the cost rationalisation process, as affirmed by 
Gilson et al., producers recognised that it would no longer be possible to maintain cutting-edge 
technology in every field required for the success of their product.15 
Another important driver is the development of information technology, which, on the one 
hand, allowed the modularisation of components and systems, facilitating the transfer of parts of the 
project to sources outside the company, but on the other also allowed the development of mechanisms 
that facilitate the co-ordination of co-design relations.16 
 
I.3.  Consequences of the Global Re-structuring of Production 
After these changes in global production organisation, production nowadays has become increasingly 
fragmented, both across geographic space and between firms.17 
The consequences of this re-structuring are far-reaching, but two can be highlighted. 
The first is that vertical disintegration, and the increase in outsourcing and internationalisation 
of production, created the opportunity for many developing countries to become part of these new 
global value chains (GVCs) by specialising in just one or a few facets of the production activities 
involved in making the final product, activities which, as already mentioned, in most cases were once 
developed within the vertically integrated firm.18 
The second is that it also represented a “breach” with the dichotomy of “market” versus 
“hierarchy”, with the development of new contractual practices and new models of collaboration 
among firms, which includes the (re-) emergence19 of network forms, both vertical and horizontal. 
These new forms for the co-ordination and organisation of fragmented production do not, in fact, fit 
either in the category of market, or under the category of hierarchy.20 
This paper will proceed by first analysing the opportunities created by granting the Small and 
Medium Enterprises (SMEs) of developing countries access to the GVC, and then by analysing the 
role of contractual networks as an instrument to facilitate this access and increase the benefits that the 
SMEs can derive from it, before concluding with an analysis of the problématique regarding the lack 
of proper legal tools to regulate access through contractual networks, using a Brazilian case study as 
the basis for this analysis. 
                                                      
14 In fact, concentration, trough mergers and acquisitions, were necessary, but not sufficient, to adapt industry to these new 
and particularly demanding conditions. J. Niosi, H. Zhegu, op. cit. p. 118. 
15 R. Gilson, C. Sabel, R. Scott, op. cit. p. 434. 
16 See R. N. Langlois, ‘The Vanishing Hand: The Changing Dynamics of Industrial Capitalism’, Industrial and Corporate 
Change, 12 (2003) pp. 351- 376, especially pp. 370-376; R. Quadros et al, op. cit. p. 77, and also R. Gilson, C. Sabel, R. 
Scott, op. cit. 
17 G. Gereffi, J. Humphrey, T. Sturgeon, op. cit. p. 80.  
18 According to the Inter-American Development Bank (IDB), “Fragmentation and vertical specialization eliminate the need 
to gain competency in all aspects of production and allow developing countries to enter into the network of cross-border 
production sharing by focusing on just one (or a few) facet(s) of production activities involved in making the final good”. 
Inter-American Development Bank (IDB), ‘International Product Fragmentation and the Insertion of LAC in Global 
Production Networks’, Call For Research Proposals, 2011, p. 1. 
19 On the argument, see S. Deakin, ‘The Return of the Guild? Network Relation in Historical Perspective’, in: M. Amstutz & 
G. Teubner (ed.), Networks: Legal Issues of Multilateral Co-operation, Oxford–Portland OR, Hart Publishing, 2009.  
20 For the most prominent study on the different types of supply chain governance within this new form of product 
organization, see See G. Gereffi, J. Humphrey, T. Sturgeon, op. cit.  
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II. The Opportunity for Developing Countries to Access International Markets 
 
II.1  The Access of SMEs to GVCs 
The changes in global production organisation have created new opportunities for developing 
countries to participate in the international market.21 As affirmed by the Inter-American Development 
Bank (IDB), in the absence of vertical dis-integration, developing countries would have to master 
production processes in their entirety in order to become viable competitors in world markets. Instead, 
fragmentation and vertical specialisation eliminate the need to gain competency in all the aspects of 
production, allowing the firms from developing countries, especially SMEs, to gain access to 
international markets through GVCs.22 
In fact, in the last three decades, firms from developing countries, especially SMEs, have 
significantly increased their participation in GVCs, gaining access to international markets. This is the 
case, for example, for the Brazilian SMEs of the commercial aircraft industry, upon which this paper 
is focused. 
The benefits that local producers can have from accessing the international market through 
GVCs are many.23 First of all, participation in GVCs not only allows an increase in the volume of 
trade but also multiplies business opportunities, even outside the chain.  Second, it creates 
opportunities for faster technological learning, innovation and skill acquisition, which may allow 
SMEs to improve their performance and increase their competitiveness in both the domestic and 
international markets. 
Being part of a GVC may, in fact, allow suppliers to gain access to new production process 
and technologies more easily and to receive chain-specific know-how from lead enterprises in GVCs. 
In fact, the trade-, investment-, and knowledge-flows that underpin GVCs can provide the mechanism 
for firms in developing countries to upgrade their activities in a variety of different ways. 
Humphrey and Schimitz list four types of industrial upgrading associated with GVC: (i) in process 
upgrading (in order to increase the efficiency of the production process by re-organising the 
production system or introducing superior technology); (ii) in product upgrading (in order to move 
into more sophisticated product lines with higher added value per unit); (iii) a functional upgrading (to 
increase the overall skill content of its activities by engaging in new functions – or by abandoning 
existing ones); and finally (iv) inter-sectorial upgrading (to use the knowledge acquired from the 
access to GVCs to become a producer of new products in new sectors which require the related 
knowledge).24 
It is also important to note that the suppliers in developing countries are often expected to 
meet requirements that frequently do not (yet) apply to their own domestic markets. In fact, GVC-
linked transactions are normally accompanied with quality-control systems and prevailing global 
                                                      
21 The importance of the new opportunities created for developing countries by these changes has been underlined by 
different scholars. As affirmed by Athukorala, “Fragmentation of production and the emergence of new forms of 
international trade have begun to open up new opportunities for developing countries and transition economies to 
participate in a finer international division of labour”. P.Athukorala, ‘Product Fragmentation and Trade Patterns in East 
Asia’, Research School of Pacific and Asian Studies, Australian National University, Working Paper 2003/21, 2003, p. 8. 
It has also being the object of a research project of the Inter-American Development Bank (IDB) on ‘International 
Product Fragmentation and the Insertion of LAC in Global Production Networks’ in which I took part, and by which this 
paper is greatly inspired. See IDB, op. cit.  
22 IDB, op. cit. p. 2. 
23 See J. Humphrey, H. Schmitz, ‘How does insertion in global value chains affect upgrading in industrial clusters?’ Regional 
Studies 36 (2002) pp. 10117-1027; D. Keesing, S. Lall, ‘Marketing manufactured exports from developing countries: 
Learning sequences and public support’, in G. Helleiner, (Ed.) Trade policy, industrialisation and development, Oxford 
University Press, Oxford, 1992, pp. 176-193, and also H. Schmitz, P. Knorringa, ‘Learning from global buyers’, Journal 
of Development Studies 37 (2000) pp. 177-205.  
24 For example, knowledge acquired in producing televisions might be used to make monitors and other computer equipment. 
J. Humphrey, H. Schimitz, op. cit. p. 1022. 
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business standards (including regulatory ones)25 that exceed those in developing countries. Once 
suppliers can meet the requirements of a GVC, it will open the opportunity to (i) participate on the 
international market also through other GVCs, both in the same and in other connected sectors of the 
economy; and (ii) achieve a greater success in their own market, spilling over into the domestic market 
the technological gains obtained from its participation in the GVC. 
Although accessing the GVC for SMEs in developing countries is often an opportunity for 
growth, it is not always an easy task (see Sturgeon, 2009 and Whittaker et al 2010 for a discussion). 
There are many factors which not only deter the access of SMEs,26 but also determine both the 
modalities and the degrees of benefits that firms from developing countries can obtain from it. 
In fact, access to the GVC may itself be beneficial only on certain conditions, which can be 
related (i) to the governance of the supply chain, (ii) to its length and where the access occurs, and (iii) 
to the mode of entering the GVC.27 
 
II.2.  Conditioning Factor of a Beneficial Access 
 
II.2.a  The Governance of the Supply Chain 
The type of governance of the supply chain is particularly important in determining the degree of 
generation, transfer and diffusion of knowledge leading to innovation, which, as already mentioned, is 
fundamental to enable firms to upgrade and benefit from GVC access.28 
In fact, within GVCs, we can find different forms of governance that will lead to quite distinct 
implications for the learning and upgrading opportunities for firms in developing countries. In this 
sense, Humphrey and Schimitz make a very interesting analysis, which demonstrates that insertion in 
what they call the “quasi-hierarchical chain”29 offers very favourable conditions for both fast process 
                                                      
25 Ever more processes and products are subject to different regulatory regimes, operating both at the international and 
domestic level. Compliance with these regulations often requires high investments not only in knowledge but also in 
physical capital. The leading enterprise transfers regulatory capabilities to the participants of the chain in order to meet 
regulatory requirements, which the upstream firms can use even outside the relationship with the MNC. Access to GVC 
becomes an instrument to increase the skills to comply with international regulations. 
26 This is not the place to make a deep analysis of the obstacles. In a general way, they can be of different types: institutional, 
social, economic and technical. They are both dependent on the supply chain structure and choices made by the leading 
enterprise and/or correlated to the market structure. For example: ever more access to GVCs is made conditional upon 
meeting quality requirements, often associated to technical or private standards set above those mandated by public 
domestic or international legislation. Meeting regulatory requirements often calls for relevant financial and organizational 
investments, given that especially technical standards may require significant changes in the production process and 
certification of compliance by private bodies. Costs are often prohibitive for small enterprises, driving SMEs away from 
international markets. 
27 F. Cafaggi, L. F. J. Swensson, R.P. Macedo Junior, C. P. Gross, T.A. Silva, L. G. Almeida, T.A. Ribeiro, ‘Accessing the 
GVC in a changing institutional environment: Comparing aeronautics and coffee’, Inter-American Development Bank 
Working Paper Series, IDB-WP-370, November 2012, pp. 5-7. 
28 J. Humphrey, H. Schimitz, op. cit. p. 1019. 
29 Humphrey and Schmitiz presented in their papers four types of relationships in value chains: 
     “Arm’s length market relations: Buyer and supplier do not develop close relationships. This implies that the supplier has 
the capacity to produce the product the buyer wants, and also that the buyer's requirements (including quality, reliability, 
etc.) could be met by a range of firms. The product should be standard or easily customised and any process requirements 
can be met by non- transaction specific standards of the sort verified by independent certification. 
      Networks: Firms co-operate in a more information-intensive relationship, frequently dividing essential value chain 
competences between them. The relationship is characterised by reciprocal dependence. In this case, the buyer may 
specify certain product performance standards or process standards to be attained, but should be confident that the 
supplier can meet them. 
      Quasi hierarchy: One firm exercises a high degree of control over other firms in the chain, frequently specifying the 
characteristics of the product to be produced, and sometimes specifying the processes to be followed and the control 
mechanisms to be enforced. This level of control can arise not only from the lead firm's role in defining the product, but 
also from the buyer's perceived risk of losses from the suppliers’ performance failures. In other words, there are some 
Luana F. Joppert Swensson 
6 
and product upgrading, but hinders functional upgrading. On the other hand, in chains characterised by 
market-based relationships, both process and product upgrading tend to be slower (not fostered by 
global buyers), while the road to functional upgrading is more open. Lastly, chains characterised by 
“networks” offer the most ideal upgrading conditions, but are the least suitable for the producers in 
developing countries because of the high level of (complementary) competences required.30 
 
II.2.b  The Length of the GVC and where Access Occurs 
The length of the supply chain varies both across, and within, sectors; at which point of the GVC entry 
occurs, and with what kind of contractual arrangement, is extremely relevant with regard to the 
benefits that SMEs from developing countries can obtain from GVC entry. 
In our example of the GVC of the commercial aircraft industry, we can identify at least three 
levels with very distinct types of contractual arrangements, governance and interaction, in terms of 
technological flow and value flow among the firms.31 
The first, which is the closest to the Multinational Corporation (MNC), is that of risk-partners, 
which combines risk sharing, co-financing, and co-development, with intense co-operation among the 
firms, not only with regard to the development of the product supplied, but also of the entire aircraft 
programme. Firms are linked through bilateral and exclusive contracts, and their relationship is 
characterised by mutual dependence and a high exchange of technological and tacit knowledge.  
The second is that of suppliers that, in contrast to risk partners, do not participate in the 
airplane-development process, or in the financing of the programme, and do not share any direct risk. 
Instead, they supply components or sub-systems with relatively high technological and economic 
value directly to the MNC, following its specifications and taking on the responsibility for the 
competences relating to the production technology. They can have contracts which are either exclusive 
or non-exclusive. 
The third level is that of sub-contractors, who, in general, receive the raw materials, moulds, 
specifications, and design from the lead firm, and perform activities, or supply parts, with lower 
economical or technological value, charging on an employee-hour or machine-hour basis. They 
normally do not have exclusive contracts and their relationship with the MNC is characterised by a 
high dependence on the MNC and a high degree of control on the part of the MNC over the activities 
performed by the sub-contractor. 
The entry location in the supply chain determines the degree of the expected benefits, which 
tend to diminish the further the firm is from the MNC. 
 
II.2.c  The Different Modes of Access 
Another very important point, which may determine the benefits of access with regard to the 
modalities of access, can be done by the enterprise either individually or via a network. 
Access to the GVC, especially through a direct contract with the MNC, pre-supposes 
compliance with a set of thresholds, related to both financial and technological capabilities, designed 
by the MNC, to start a contractual relationship with its suppliers or to determine their position in the 
supply chain. 
Empirical research shows that firms can access GVCs in different ways.  Less competent 
suppliers, especially SMEs, can access the GVC by becoming an independent sub-contractor or 
(Contd.)                                                                    
doubts about the competence of the supply chain. The lead firm in the chain may exercise control not only over its direct 
suppliers but also further along the chain. 
      Hierarchy: The lead firm takes direct ownership of some operations in the chain.” J. Humphrey, H. Schimitz, op. cit. p. 
1025. 
      The more recent literature, (See G. Gereffi, J. Humphrey, T. Sturgeon, op. cit.) developed a more complete typology of 
value chain governance, identifying five basic types of value chain governance (market, modular, relational, captive and 
hierarchy), which I adopt in this paper. 
30 J. Humphrey, H. Schimitz, op. cit. p. 1026. 
31 See F. Cafaggi, L. F. J. Swensson, R.P. Macedo Junior, C. P. Gross, T.A. Silva, L. G. Almeida, T.A. Ribeiro, T.A.; op. cit. 
pp. 14-18. 
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supplier of other firms engaged in a contractual relationship with the MNC in question, even if they do 
not have the capabilities needed to comply with the specific requirements of the MNC for a direct 
contractual relationship. The problématique with regard to this form of access is that the suppliers 
mediate their relationship between the SME and the MNC, and often the benefits of accessing the 
GVC are “filtered” by these intermediaries.32 
Second, suppliers can try to access the GVC by means of a direct contract with the MNC. 
However, SMEs may not have the scale or scope of competencies needed to meet the requirements of 
the lead firm.  They can solve this problem in two different ways. First, suppliers can undertake an 
individual growth strategy, often through mergers, in order to meet the MNC’s requirements and 
access the GVC directly. Second, they can create a collaborative venture to generate economies of 
scale, scope and specialisation, which may allow the firms not only to meet the thresholds designed by 
the MNC to start the contractual relationship, but also to access the GVC in a better position. In other 
words, firms can access the GVC via networks.33 
The remainder of this paper is primarily focused on the second approach, namely, an analysis 
of the use of contractual networks not only as one of the modes of access to the GVC, but also as an 
instrument to promote a more beneficial way of access for the SMEs of developing countries. 
 
III.  The Acccess to the GVC through Contractual Inter-firm Networks 
 
III.1.  The Network Phenomena 
In the last three decades, scholars from different subjects, including economists, political scientists and 
lawyers, have paid significant attention to the network phenomena.34 
This particular interest can be justified both by the massive increase in contractual networks in 
the period, due to the already mentioned changes in production organisation worldwide and its actual 
importance, and, especially, because of its particular and conflicting characteristics, which undermine 
not only the traditional distinction between the market and hierarchy, but also the distinction between 
contract, torts, and corporation.35 
Empirical observation demonstrates, in fact, that, in the last three decades, there has being an 
increasing spread of contractual network arrangements between organisations in many branches of 
business. In effect, as already mentioned, one of the results of the re-organisation of production 
undergone by the main industries over the last decades is precisely the (re-) emergence of the network 
phenomenon, translated in a different and separate mode of production organisation.36 
Currently, contractual business networks constitute, together with pyramidal groups, one of 
the most diffused forms of production organisation, present in the most economically important and 
diverse markets, from energy to telecom, from banking to transport and aviation.37 
But, as suggested also by Marc Amstutz, Vaios Karavas and Gunther Teubner, the fascination 
with the network phenomenon is explained not only by its empirical frequency but also because the 
contractual network goes beyond the scope of the forms of action, established in both the economy 
                                                      
32 F. Cafaggi, L. F. J. Swensson, R.P. Macedo Junior, C. P. Gross, T.A. Silva, L. G. Almeida, T.A. Ribeiro, op. cit. p. 68. 
33 Ibidem. 
34 See M. Amstutz, V. Karavas, G. Teubner, ‘Preface’, p. VII in M. Amstutz, G. Teubner (ed), Networks: Legal Issues of 
Multilateral Co-operation, Hart Publishing, Oxford and Portland, 2009. Among the economists, the most prominent, O. 
Willianson, op. cit. Among the sociologists, the most prominent W. Powell, op. cit. 
35 G. Teubner, ‘Coincidentia Oppositorum: Hybrid Networks Beyond Contract and Organization’ in M. Amstutz, G. Teubner 
(ed), Networks: Legal Issues of Multilateral Co-operation, op. cit. p.3. 
36 On the subject see S. Deakin, op. cit., R. Gilson, C. Sabel and R. Scott, op. cit. p. 448, W. Powell, op. cit.; F. Cafaggi, 
‘Contractual Networks and the Small Business Act: Towards European Principles?’, European Review Contract Law, 49 
(2008) pp. 493-539, among many others. 
37 F. Cafaggi, ‘Contractual Networks and the Small Business Act: Towards European Principles?’ op. cit. p. 538. 
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and in society, which should be considered as crucial: the network fits neither in the category of 
market, nor in that of the organisation.38 
As affirmed by Fabrizio Cafaggi, contractual networks cannot be subsumed in the market 
category because the participants are not impersonal agents but well-identified players, chosen upon 
the basis of resource complementarities. They permit the resource bundling that market relations are 
unable to achieve. On the other hand, they cannot be subsumed under the category of hierarchies 
because the firms are autonomous and legally-independent entities.39 
In the same way, networks fit neither into the market nor the hierarchy category, and they also 
fail to fit into the most traditional categories of private law: contract and corporate law. In fact, 
networks pose remarkable challenges to law, as they are located precisely at the intersection between 
contract and organisation.40 Neither one of the two traditional private law concepts are able, alone and 
in their traditional conception, to explain in its entirety the network phenomena or to deal with the 
problems which it poses, especially those concerned with solidarity among network participants, and 
liability towards third parties.41 
Consequently, lawyers, as well as scholars of other subjects, have increasingly dedicated 
themselves to the study of the network phenomena, to the definition of its legal concept,42 as well as to 
the legal issues that it poses, regarding both its internal and its external relations.43 An analysis of 
contract networks under a law perspective follows, in order to focus on its multilateral form and to 
analyse its use as an instrument of access to GVCs and the problématique that it poses. 
 
III.2.  Contract Networks 
Contractual networks, as already mentioned, are hybrid forms of organisation located between markets 
and hierarchies, which represent a form of co-ordination of the economic activities of legally-
independent parties who co-operate in order to achieve a common objective.44 
Despite the great doctrinal discussion about the possibilities of defining a legally-specific 
concept for the contractual network, and its absence in domestic or international law,45 some scholars, 
such as Cafaggi, based upon the empirical evidence of the existence of large contractual networks as 
formalised arrangements, argue that a formal concept of contractual networks is both theoretically 
possible and empirically accurate.46 
According to both this author and Paola Iamiceli’s definition, which we share, the contractual 
network is: 
                                                      
38 M. Amstutz, V. Karavas, G. Teubner, op. cit. p. VII. 
39 F. Cafaggi, ‘Contractual Networks and the Small Business Act’, op. cit. p. 496. 
40 Ibid, p. 503. 
41 As affirmed by Teubner, “any attempt to subsume networks simply under traditional private law concepts is, to cut a long 
story short, doomed to failure. First, company law is inappropriate for market networks, since the pooling of resources 
and joint decision-making do not suit the decentralized network structures. Secondly, given the radical individualism of 
the single nodes in networks, contract law is, indeed, the correct systematic arena, but needs to be considerably 
transformed for the opportunities and risks of market networks.” G. Teubner, op. cit. p. 13. 
42 On the argument, see R. M. Buxbaum ‘Is “Network” a Legal Concept?’, Journal of Institutional and Theoretical 
Economics 149 (1993)  pp. 698-705 at 698, and, following the debate, G. Teubner, op. cit.  
43 See M. Amstutz, G. Teubner (ed.), Networks: Legal Issues of Multilateral Co-operation, Hart Publishing, Oxford and 
Portland, 2009, and F. Cafaggi, op. cit.  
44 F. Cafaggi, ‘Contractual Networks and Contract Theory: A Research Agenda for European Contract Law’ in F. Cafaggi 
(ed) Contractual networks, Inter-Firm Cooperation and Economic growth, Edward Elgar, 2011, p. 66. 
45 On the argument, see R.M. Buxbaum, op. cit. p. 698 and, following the debate, G. Teubner, Coincidentia Oppositorum op. 
cit.; J. N. Druey, ‘The Path to the Law: The Difficult Legal Access of Networks’ in M. Amstutz, G. Teubner (ed), 
Networks: Legal Issues of Multilateral Co-operation, op. cit.; M. Amstutz, ‘The Constitution of Contractual Networks’ in 
M. Amstutz, G. Teubner (ed), Networks: Legal Issues of Multilateral Co-operation, op. cit. 
46 F. Cafaggi, ‘Contractual Networks, Vertical Disintegration and Inter-firm Cooperation’ in F. Cafaggi (ed) Contractual 
networks, Inter-Firm Cooperation and Economic growth, op. cit. p. 12.,  
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a collaborative structure, governed through a multilateral contract, a set of bilateral linked 
contracts and/or a new entity (a corporation, association, foundation, etc.) in which two or more 
enterprises participate without being incorporated into it. 
 
Through the network, parties – that can even be competitors – pursue a common objective and aim to 
conduct one or more projects of common interest. To do this, they share their strategic objectives and 
critical resources by co-operating with each other and co-ordinating their activities in order to achieve 
the common goal.47 
With regard to the governance of the structure of the contractual network, it can occur 
mainly,48 (i) by a set of bilateral contracts (in which case, the contractual network is also known as a 
network of contracts), or (ii) by multilateral contract (also known as a network of enterprises). 
Although most of the doctrine pays attention to the first typology in particular, which is the 
most common one, and is present, in general, in the supply chain, with sequential contracting, and is 
often deployed when several bilateral contracts which are functionally linked in order to contribute to 
a single production process, it is precisely in the second type that we can identify the most suitable 
instrument of access for the SMEs into new GVCs. 
 
III.3. Contractual Network of Multilateral Contracts (Network of Enterprises) 
According to Cafaggi’s definition, a network of multilateral contracts occurs when a group of 
enterprises co-operates to perform a common objective and creates a co-operative venture by way of a 
multilateral contract combining input, output, or both.49 
Among its distinctive characteristics, there are50 (i) the plurality of parties (at least three); (ii) 
the pursuit of common objectives; (iii) the stability of the multilateral contractual relationship; and (iv) 
the high interdependence among legally-independent parties.51 This model of the contractual network 
also implies some degree of jointly-made decisions regarding investments and the pooling of 
resources.52 
Networks of enterprises can be used, according to the literature, to achieve different common 
objectives: to access new forms of technology, to benefit from economies of scale in joint research 
and/or production, and to access new markets.53 In fact, the contractual network of multilateral 
contracts can be an important instrument for enabling enterprises to co-ordinate their activities and 
thereby gain access to the international market. 
In addition, it can be used to produce a common and more complex product, assimilating 
complementary forms of input, which may allow them to access a new market through a GVC, or to 
achieve a better position in the supply chain. A significant example can be found in the aeronautic 
industry, where the MNC in question prefers to have a direct relationship with suppliers who are able 
to supply a “complete solution”, in general, sub-systems, and not small and separated parts. The 
                                                      
47 F. Cafaggi, P. Iamiceli, ‘Introduction’ in F. Cafaggi, P. Iamiceli (ed) ‘Inter-Firm Networks in the European Wine Industry’, 
EUI Working Paper, 2010.  
48 As affirmed by Cafaggi, contractual networks can take at least two other different legal forms. The first one is an 
intermediate form which consists in a multilateral contract as a framework contract and bilateral executory contracts 
between parties to regulate the specific elements of the transaction. The second one is based on a series of interrelated 
contracts for the benefit of a third party. F. Cafaggi, Contractual Networks and the Small Business Act, op. cit. p. 509. 
49 Ibid. 
50 For an overview of the distinct characteristics of contractual networks that we share, see F. Cafaggi, ‘Contractual Networks 
and the Small Business Act’, op. cit., p. 496-497 and also P. Iamiceli, ‘Le reti di imprese: modelli contrattuali di 
coordinamento’, in F. Cafaggi (ed), Reti di imprese tra regolazione e norme sociali, Bologna, Il Mulino, 2004, p. 125. 
51 As affirmed by F. Cafaggi, the relationships among the parties should be characterized by a certain degree of stability 
(unlike those relationships which dissolve once the economic operation for which they have been set up has been 
concluded)  F. Cafaggi, op. cit, p. 515. 
52 F. Cafaggi, ‘Contractual Networks and the Small Business Act’, op. cit. p. 513. 
53 See. O.Powell, op. cit.  
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possibility of producing a more complex product would allow the SMEs to achieve not only a direct 
contract with the MNC, but also to achieve a much better position within the GVC. 
In addition, networks of enterprise can also be used, within the broader objective of market 
access, in the case of activities that can be performed separately, for joint-purchasing purposes, to 
develop a joint-marketing strategy, for example, to produce joint international publicity, to participate 
in international trade-fairs, to form a united front in the negotiation of raw materials, etc., and to 
acquire jointly the financial and technological capabilities designed by the MNC. It also constitutes an 
interesting instrument to share the risks among the participants when the uncertainties regarding the 
final outcomes are high. 
The use of multilateral contracts to co-ordinate the economic activities performed by each 
autonomous participant is not limited to only one type of enterprises. In fact, companies and firms of 
different sizes, ranging from SMEs to MNCs, can use multilateral contracts to constitute a network. 
It is important, however, to mention that not all multilateral contracts among enterprises amount to a 
network. There must be a certain degree of stability, complementarity and high interdependence 
among the performances that characterise the contractual relationship.54 
Despite the common features of the network of enterprise model, in practice different types of 
legal structures can be used to co-ordinate the activities of the parties. 
In most cases, pure contractual instruments are deployed and, in such cases, the contractual 
network does not imply the creation of an independent legal entity. Some examples here include the 
networks formed through contractual joint ventures and, most commonly, through consortiums in the 
legal systems, as in Brazil, where this legal institute is regulated as a contract. 
However, multilateral contracts can also generate more structured forms of co-operation, 
which present organisational characteristics, such as the consortium in the Italian legal system. In fact, 
according to Article 2620 of the Italian Civil Code, the consortium gives birth to a common 
organisation, and is not considered only as a contractual agreement. Another example is the European 
Economic Interest Grouping (EEIG) introduced by Council Regulation 2137/85.55 
In other cases, although the parties maintain their independence, a completely new entity is 
created, such as a limited liability company. Often this choice is made due to the inadequacy of the 
contractual instruments to govern the network structure and comply with its exigencies, forcing the 
parties to resort to company law, which, as already mentioned, presents significant limits to the 
governance of the network model.56 
The lack of a proper legal tool to govern contractual networks may pose significant problems, 
which may limit its utility and restrict its function as an instrument of access to new GVCs, as we can 
see in the Brazilian aircraft industry example. 
                                                      
54 As affirmed by Cafaggi, “Multilateral contracts constitute networks when the level of interdependence among 
performances is such that the contract is not easily divisible and the purpose would be frustrated if one party does not or 
cannot perform and cannot be substituted. Parties’ obligations in contractual multiparty networks are mutually dependent 
and not easily severable. Not only is each party’s obligation dependent upon all the others but substitutability is difficult 
and costly.”  F. Cafaggi, ‘Contractual networks and contract theory: a research agenda for European Contract Law’, in F. 
Cafaggi (ed), Contractual Networks, Inter-Firm Cooperation and Economic Growth, op. cit. p. 88.  
55 See F. Cafaggi, ‘Contractual Networks and the Small Business Act’, op. cit. p. 514, 
56 As affirmed by G. Teubner, “company law is inappropriate for market networks, since the pooling of resources and joint 
decision-making do not suit the decentralized network structures.” G. Teubner, ‘Coincidentia Oppositorum’, op. cit. p. 
11.  
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IV.  Access via Networks in the Brazilian Aircraft Industry: the Case of the 
Consortium, High Technology Aeronautics57 
 
IV.1.  The Brazilian Aircraft Industry and the “Emancipation” of its SMEs 
The Brazilian aircraft industry provides an interesting example not only of the use of the contractual 
network as an instrument to access GVCs, but also of the problématique regarding its regulation. 
In the last three decades, the aerospace sector has grown significantly in Brazil. Although the 
sector is still principally connected to the main Brazilian aeronautic producer Embraer (Empresa 
Brasileira de Aeronáutica S.A.), in recent years, there has been significant growth also among new 
small and medium firms, which specialised in the supply of high-tech components and services. With 
the recent introduction of such components and services into the different GVCs, Brazil is becoming 
part of this global market, increasing its exportation of these new niche products and services.58 
A key development in the Brazilian aerospace sector occurred with the privatisation of 
Embraer in 1994, which was acquired by a consortium of local enterprises and pension funds led by 
the Bozano Simonsen Group. Following the privatisation, Embraer has passed through the process of 
vertical dis-integration and re-structuring of its production organisation, in conformity, as already 
mentioned, with a wider global trend. It led to the focus on its core activities as system integrator,59 to 
an increase in its outsourcing of peripheral activities and the re-structuring of its supply chain into 
three levels of collaboration: risk partners, suppliers, and sub-contractors.60 It results in Embraer being 
one of the largest commercial aircraft manufacturers in the world (the fourth largest western 
aeronautics firm, after Boeing, Airbus, and Bombardier).61 
One of the most important consequences of Embraer’s vertical disintegration was the 
promotion of the establishment of new enterprises to be its suppliers and main sub-contractors. Most 
of them are owned by former Embraer employees who lost their jobs during the privatisation, and 
were created with the direct support of the MNC for the supply of parts and services, such as machine 
parts, printed pieces, composite material, engineering, software, management, thermal treatment, etc.62 
These new firms were initially predominantly small- and medium-sized family-run enterprises, 
characterised by significant fragilities. 
Their relationship with Embraer occurred mainly through a direct sub-contract system, in 
which Embraer provided the raw materials, moulds, specifications and designs, and the SMEs 
                                                      
57 For a complete overview of the HTA case study, see F. Cafaggi, L. F. J. Swensson, R.P. Macedo Junior, C. P. Gross, T.A. 
Silva, L. G. Almeida, T.A. Ribeiro, op. cit.  
58 For a more substantial overview, see R. P. Dagnino ‘A indústria aeronáutica. ECIB – Estudo da Competitividade da 
Indústria Brasileira’, Nota Técnica Setorial, IE/Unicamp/FINEP/PADCT, Campinas, 1993; ABDI, Estudos Setoriais de 
Inovação: setor aeronáutico. Belo Horizonte, 2009; R. Bernardes, M. Pinho, ‘Aglomeração e Aprendizado na Rede de 
Fornecedores Locais da Embraer’, Research Report, Redes de Sistemas Produtivos e Inovativos Locais, University
 of Rio de Janeiro, Rio de Janeiro, 2002. 
59 Embraer’s strategy became based on the added value principle and therefore the focus was not on being able to produce a 
whole aircraft from scratch, but on the capacity of combining and adapting subsystems according to the needs of the 
projects. Lima et al. J. C. Lima, M. A. Pinto, M. N. Migon, G. C. Montoro, M. F. Alves, ‘A Cadeia Aeronáutica 
Brasileira e o Desafio da Inovação’,  BNDES Setorial, 21 (2005), p. 45. 
60 On the restructuration of the Embraer production organization, see R.Bernardes, M.Pinho, op. cit., R.Bernardes,  ‘O caso Embraer – privatização e transformação da gestão empresarial: 
dos imperativos tecnológicos à focalização do mercado’, Cadernos de Gestão Tecnológica, 46, CYTED, PGT/SP, São Paulo, 2000;  Quadros, op. cit.  
61 UNCTAD, op. cit p. 6. 
62 Ibid, 68. Nowadays the Brazilian Aerospace Industry is the largest in the Southern Hemisphere, with more than 70 SMEs 
(based on 2007 data). They offer a variety of products, including airplanes, helicopters, structural segments, engines, 
aircraft/engines components, on-board systems and equipment, and air traffic control systems. Maintenance, repair and 
overhaul (MRO) services are provided to civil and military aircraft of all sizes including major checks, structural 
modifications, as well as engine and components overhaul. In addition, some Brazilian firms are FAA Approved Repair 
Stations and EASA Approved Maintenance Organizations (AMO). In: Brazilian Aerospace Industry, 
http://www.aiab.org.br/english/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=13&Itemid=26. 
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undertook activities such as machining, printing, and parts assembly, charging on employee-hour or 
machine-hour basis. 
They usually participated almost exclusively within Embraer’s production chain in a 
relationship characterised by its high dependence. For most of the SME sub-contractors, around 90 per 
cent of their revenues come, or used to come, from the relationship with the anchor enterprise.This 
dependence on one main MNC makes the SMEs extremely vulnerable. 
Although the international market for intermediary input in the aerospace industry had grown 
significantly in the last decades after the de-verticalisation of the main firms in the sector, which 
presented a great opportunity for growth, most of the Brazilian SMEs were not able to access the 
international market through other GVCs. In fact, although the global trade of components for the 
aerospace industry, including the value of the services provided in the sector, such as those related to 
the manufacturing of components, assembling, surface treatment and machining, reaches around 35 
billion USD per year, the participation of the Brazilian SMEs in this amount was almost zero.63 
In the last two decades, however, the situation has evolved significantly, and Brazil has started 
to take its first steps towards the promotion of the access of its aircraft-industry SMEs to the 
international market. In fact, the SMEs in the sector started to adopt new strategies in order to insert 
themselves in the international market through the GVC of other aircraft producers or sub-system 
manufacturers.64 In this process, they could also count on government support, especially through the 
BNDES (Banco Nacional do Desenvolvimento Econômico e Social – National Bank of Economic and 
Social Development)65, the ApexBrasil (Agência Brasileira de Pomoção e Exportação de 
Investimentos – the Brazilian Trade and Investment Promotion Agency),66 and the ABDI (Agência 
Brasileira de Desenvolvimento Industrial – the Brazilian Agency for Industrial Development).67 In 
fact, the development of the national suppliers with a global reach, and an increase in the exportation 
of parts, structures and aeronautic systems, have become two of the five specific goals of the 
government’s industrial policy stipulated for the sector in the Aeronautic Production Development 
Policy (PDP).68 
Among the different modes of access promoted and undertaken by the Brazilian SMEs,69 there 
is the contractual network. In fact, a very interesting experience in the sector was provided by the 
creation of a multilateral contractual network among the Brazilian SMEs: the “consortia to export” 
entitled High Technology Aeronautics (HTA). 
                                                      
63 Data from the Brazilian Ministry of Science and Technology available at: http://www.mct.gov.br. 
64 F. Cafaggi, L. F. J. Swensson, R.P. Macedo Junior, C. P. Gross, T.A. Silva, L. G. Almeida, T.A. Ribeiro, T.A. op. cit. p. 
19. 
65 The BNDES is a company wholly owned by the federal government and supervised by the MDIC – Development, Industry 
and Commerce Ministry. It has been the main Brazilian long-term financial bank since its foundation in 1952, investing 
in all segments of the economy, within a policy that includes social, regional and environmental dimensions. (BNDES 
website) 
66 Apex-Brasil is a private agency with public functions under the supervision of the Ministry of Development, Industry and 
Foreign Trade (MDIC) created to (1) promote exports of Brazilian products and services; (2) contribute to the 
internationalization of Brazilian companies; and (3) attract foreign investment to Brazil (Apex website). 
67 The Brazilian Agency for Industrial Development (ABDI) is a private agency with public functions that has as its main 
objectives to provide a network that brings together federal ministries, state funding agencies, private sector 
representatives, civil society, and universities to promote technological and economic development in sectors of Brazilian 
industry. 
68 This specific industrial policy established 5 goals to be achieved in the aeronautic sector: (i) maintaining the third position 
in the global market of commercial airplanes; (ii) doubling the global participation in executive airplanes until 2015; (iii) 
consolidating Brazil as a centre of production and maintenance of helicopters for/in South America; (iv) developing 
national suppliers with a global reach; (v) increasing the export of parts, structures and aeronautic systems. 
69 The strategy of merging to access alone was supported particularly by the BNDES.  
Contractual Networks  
13 
 
IV.2.  The High Technology Aeronautics (HTA) 
The HTA represents an enterprise network created by a group of Brazilian SMEs in the aeronautic 
sector, with the aim to co-ordinate their activities in order to achieve two common objectives: to 
access the international market through other GVCs, and to achieve a better position in Embraer’s 
GVC, becoming a direct supplier, instead of a sub-contractor.70 
Because of the high dependence on a single client, and the vulnerability that characterized the 
relationship among most of Embraer’s sub-contractors, a group of 8 SMEs, direct sub-contractors to 
Embraer, decided to join together, maintaining, however, their status as independent legal entities, but 
creating a network to facilitate their access to new GVCs and, therefore, decreasing their dependency 
on the single client. In the year 2000, High Technology Aeronautics was born.71 
It is important to mention that the idea of creating a network as an instrument to promote the 
access of SMEs to the external market was at the base of the ApexBrasil programme, titled Consórico 
de Exportação – “Export Consortia”, within which the HTA itself was formed and received important 
support. 
The Consórcio de Exportação programme was created by ApexBrasil in 1999, with the aim of 
“sustainably [promoting an] increase of Brazilian exports, by improving the exporting capacity of 
SMEs, increasing the number of new exporting companies and creating conditions for a cultural 
change in the development of companies’ strategic plans”.72 
According to the ApexBrasil project, export consortia constitute the most intelligent way for 
most of the SMEs to export, and the best instrument through which SMEs can optimise their efforts to 
produce and commercialise their products on the international market. 
According to ApexBrasil, in fact, the export consortia allows the SMEs to keep their 
independence in the domestic market, on the one hand, and to benefit from the consortia’s operational 
efficiency and low production costs, on the other, thus being able to export their products to different 
markets, even competing with bigger suppliers. 
ApexBrasil not only promoted the creation of a network model, but also gave important 
support for its development, both with legal, administrative and knowledge support, within the 
structure of the government agency, as well as important financial support.73 
The creation of a network such as that suggested by ApexBrasil played a fundamental role in 
allowing SMEs in Brazil to access new GVCs.74 
At first glance, the network model allows a considerable reduction in the costs to be 
undertaken by individual firms in order to be able to access the international market. In fact, on their 
own, each SME would have had to invest individually in order to participate in international fairs 
(considered to be of particular importance in establishing and developing contact with new MNCs), to 
undertake an international marketing strategy, to administer the new international contracts, to develop 
a logistics department, etc. Most of these are fixed costs that could be shared among the other firms of 
the network, and which would also be significantly decreased through the support of ApexBrasil.75 
                                                      
70 HTA Statute. 
71 HTA interview. See F. Cafaggi, L. F. J. Swensson, R.P. Macedo Junior, C. P. Gross, T.A. Silva, L. G. Almeida, T.A. 
Ribeiro, op. cit. p. 34 
72 ApexBrasil, Consórcio de Exportação Project. Published at  Diário Oficial de 9 de Maio de 1999, n. 94, seção 3, pp. 65-66. 
73 Once the project was approved, Apex-Brasil would support the consortium through three phases: a) the definition of 
composition, with activities of evaluation and selection of the firms b) the creation of legal and administrative activities 
for the formation of the consortium and c) the maintenance of activities to consolidate and strengthen the consortiums, 
with a focus on actions to improve export supply and export promotion activities. Once all of the requisites were met, 
ApexBrasil would financially support the consortium to export for the first three years (in general, ApexBrasil would 
enter with R$ 1, for each R$ 1 invested by the SMEs), and then, for each additional year, a separate plan was required to 
be sent for additional financial approval. 
74 See F. Cafaggi, L. F. J. Swensson, R.P. Macedo Junior, C. P. Gross, T.A. Silva, L. G. Almeida, T.A. Ribeiro, op. cit. 
75 T. Quintanilha, M. Almeida, ‘Redes Sociais e Empreendedorismo em Pequenas Empresas de Base Tecnológica no Brasil’, 
Revista Digital Efdeportes, 13 (119) (2008) p. 13. 
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But one of the most important aspects is that the network form also allows the SMEs to supply 
jointly a more complex product to MNCs, even an entire sub-system, produced through the 
complementary performance of the parties. In this case, each participant is responsible for a part of the 
production, according to its capabilities and competences. In the commercial aircraft industry, this 
represents an important issue, in convergence with the MNCs exigencies which, as already mentioned, 
have changed their strategy by giving preference to the supply of complex and complete products, 
abandoning their direct relationships with the suppliers of small parts or partial products. 
Thus, the idea is that, through the network, the SMEs of the aircraft sector can combine their 
capabilities, share investments, and together meet the thresholds designed by the MNC, not only to 
access new GVCs, but also to achieve a better position in the supply chain. From the sub-contractors 
of small parts or services, the SMEs can become a direct supplier or, as aimed at by the HTA, even a 
risk partner, which, undoubtedly, represents a much more beneficial form of relationship in the supply 
chain.76 
Within this perspective, the HTA was created with the aim of operating as an intermediary 
between the individual SMEs and the foreign contractors, and to then co-ordinate all the activities 
regarding the contract and the production to be performed among the individual parties.77 
The HTA represents a common brand to be promoted in the foreign market. In its original 
plans, it would make direct contact and sign the contract directly with the client,78 and would then sub-
contract the production to the members individually. 
The contract could both be related to a specific product and/or service, which one single party 
could perform individually, or could, as mentioned above, be related to a product to be produced 
through the complementary input of several parties. The performance of the contract would, therefore, 
be provided by the members separately, co-ordinated by the HTA. The selection of the contractual 
performers by the HTA would occur through an internal competitive process based upon the best bid, 
as the consortium was formed with SMEs of complementary ability, as well as competitivity.79 (see 
Figure 1 in the Appendix). 
Among the co-ordination activities provided by the HTA, there are, according to its statute: 
the control and administration of contracts; the technical management of projects; the marketing and 
the sale of the products and services compatible with the capabilities of the parties; as well as aspects 
regarding the general logistics; import and export; acquisition of equipment and raw material; and to 
acquire the complementary products or services of other suppliers not available among the HTA 
members.80 
 
IV.3.  The Legal Structure of the HTA 
The name adopted by the ApexBrasil programme “exporting consortia” would lead us to think that the 
legal form to be adopted by the network promoted by the governmental agency would be exactly the 
“consortium”. 
The consortium is recognised, in fact, by the Brazilian legal system and is regulated by the law 
6.404/76 of the “Lei das Sociedades por Ações”. The two articles dedicated to this legal form basically 
limit themselves to establish (i) its definition as a contractual agreement among enterprises which have 
the aim of undertaking a specific project; (ii) the lack of legal personality; (iii) the lack of joint liability 
of the participants to third parties, unless otherwise established by the contract; and (iv) the formal 
elements that the contract may contain. The lack of appropriate legal support of the consortia in Brazil 
is widely recognised.81 
                                                      
76  F. Cafaggi, L. F. J. Swensson, R.P. Macedo Junior, C. P. Gross, T.A. Silva, L. G. Almeida, T.A. Ribeiro, op. cit. 
77 Ibidem 
78 HTA Statute, Article 30.  
79 T. Quintanilha, M. Almeida, op. cit. p. 16.  
80 HTA statute. 
81 It is interesting to note that in 2006, the Brazilian Congress passed a general law for SMEs (LC 123/2006), which, in the 
art. 56, provided the creation of new form of consortia: the “consórcio simples”. It was directed to SMEs that adopted the 
Contractual Networks  
15 
ApexBrasil, however, did not recognise the consortia, as established by the Brazilian 
legislation, as the best legal tool to govern the model of networks proposed. It established in its project 
its own definition for “consórcio de exportação”, as a “plurality of enterprises with common interest, 
grouped together in an entity legally established”, and has defined that this entity would have to adopt 
the legal form of a non-profit association, through which the enterprises would have the “mode to 
work jointly and co-operate to pursue the common objectives of improving and promoting their 
exporting activities”.82 
The non-profit association is regulated by the Brazilian civil code (Articles 1093-1096) and by 
the Constitution (Constituição Federal, Article 5, XVII-XXI). Unlike the consortium, however, it has 
a distinct legal personality, and an administrative structure, with administrative and deliberative 
organs. It also has a formal statute, which establishes the obligations and rights, both on the part of the 
members and of the association. 
Therefore, according to ApexBrasil, the association constituted the most suitable legal tool to 
govern the “consórcio de exportação”. 
However, in practice, this was not what happened in the case of the HTA. Practice 
demonstrates that the legal form of a non-profit association was incapable of being adapted to all the 
functions and activities that the HTA was expected to perform. Most of them, indeed, were 
specifically commercial and profit-aimed activities, which were incompatible with the non-profit 
association regime, which does not allow the distribution of any of the profits among its members. As 
a non-profit association, the aim of the HTA to sign the contract directly with the MNC was also 
compromised. 
In order to perform all the above-mentioned activities, other than a non-profit association 
requested by the ApexBrasil programme, the HTA members also had to establish a limited company 
(the “HTA Indústria Comércio Importação e Exportação Ltda) because of the difficulties of the 
associational model. 
This new company was formed with 99% of its shares by the “non-profit association” HTA, 
and 1% was owned by its former president, as, prior to 2011, the single-member limited company was 
not recognised by the Brazilian legal system.83 
According to an interviewee, the first idea was to establish a limited company among all the 
HTA members. However, this solution appeared too risky and inappropriate, both under the liability 
regime of the limited company, and with regard to the pooling of resources and the procedures of joint 
decision making. The solution found by its members, therefore, was to make a non-profit association, 
which was almost the single/sole owner of the limited liability company.84 
In this way, the HTA had to resort to a complex legal architecture to govern the contractual 
network using non-profit models combined with companies, because of the inadequacy of the 
Brazilian legal framework. 
 
IV.4.  Successes and Quiescence of the HTA 
The HTA played a significant role in promoting access to the international market and to new GVCs 
for most of its members. However, it did not succeed in achieving all its aims. In fact, while, initially, 
the HTA was envisaged to play a direct role, as it was to sign the contract directly with the MNC and 
(Contd.)                                                                    
“Simples” national tax regime, and had as its aim precisely to increase competitiveness and the SMEs’ entry into new 
domestic and foreign markets through economy of scale, cost reduction, strategic management, easier access to credit and 
new technologies. However, there was only a single provision and the “consórcio simples” was poorly regulated, 
generating a high level of uncertainty. In 2008, the Lei Complementar 128/08 changed this provision, eliminating the 
“consórcio simples” and replacing it with a different legal instrument, the SPE (“Sociedade de Propósito Específico”). 
82 ApexBrasil Consórcio de Exportação project, op. cit. p. 66. 
83 HTA interview. 
84 In this sense, 99 per cent of the profit earned by the limited company went to the non-profit association. As it could not be 
distributed among its members, a reserve was established to be used to deduct the monthly fee that each member would 
have to pay and also to finance the consortium after the end of the APEX support (that was, in general, provided, for the 
first three years). 
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then co-ordinate its performance among its members, it, instead, ended up having the function of an 
intermediary, with foreign firms concluding supply contracts directly with the individual firms.85 
Among the successes of the Brazilian network, we can mention a contract signed directly 
between the HTA and the EADS/CASA, within an offset agreement promoted by the Brazilian 
government.86 The ten-year contract, for the supply of parts, was signed directly by the HTA and the 
production was sub-contracted among some of its members, in particular, the Autômata ThyssenKrupp 
Industria de peças Ltda and Grauna Aerospace S.A. (Grauna). In fact, through this contract, these 
Brazilian enterprises were able to gain access to a new GVC via the network.87 Although access to the 
EADS/CASA GVC did not proceed exactly as was initially expected, the network model adopted by 
the HTA was evaluated both by the EADS/CASA and the Brazilian Ministry of Development Trade 
and Industry (MDIC), as an excellent one for the assignment of compensation schemes within offset 
agreements.88 
With regard to the aim of upgrading in Embraer’s supply chain, becoming a risk partner, the 
HTA was not successful. However, it is important to mention that the HTA almost achieved this aim. 
The HTA, in fact, participated in Embraer’s selection for the PHENON programme to supply the 
central fuselage. Their proposal was second to ENAER’s after the initial selection procedure. 
Although both started to work in a joint project, it was a change of strategy on the part of Embraer, 
which decided to produce this system internally, that ended the project. In fact, according to the HTA 
ex-president, the network had the technological and administrative capacity to perform the series of 
activities involved in being a sub-system integrator. 
Although HTA did not completely succeed in its aims to provide directly for the insertion into 
new GVCs, its role as an intermediary was fundamental for the success of many of its members to (i) 
access other GVCs, (ii) to acquire a better position in other supply chains and (iii) to reduce their 
dependence on Embraer.89 
A significant case is that of the Grauna Aerospace S.A., one of the founding members of the 
HTA. Through its participation in the HTA it was able to sign direct contracts and access the GVC of 
other MNCs, such as Pratt & Whitney, ASCO, and TESCO, most of them as a supplier and not as a 
subcontractor. All these MNC, in fact, first approached the HTA, and successively chose Grauna, 
allowing the company to access these GVCs and acquire many of the benefits that, as mentioned 
before, the access to the international market through GVC can bring to SMEs of developing 
countries.90 The joint market, participation in international fairs, the support of ApexBrasil, and many 
                                                      
85 F. Cafaggi, L. F. J. Swensson, R.P. Macedo Junior, C. P. Gross, T.A. Silva, L. G. Almeida, T.A. Ribeiro, op. cit. 
86 The contract agreed between HTA and EADS/CASA, was part of an offset agreement established by the Brazilian Minister 
of Defense for the acquisition of light airplanes for transportation (C-295BR) from the European group. Among the 
compensation required, such as transfer of technology and the provision of support to the Brazilian company ELEB in 
selling its products to other enterprises of the group EADS, it was specifically requested that the EADS had to buy parts 
manufactured in Brazil to the amount of at least US$ 30 million (BNDES website). 
87 Some factors, such as the financial crisis of 2009, that strongly affected the sector, in fact, significantly reduced the 
purshased orders from the EADS/CASA, and consequently the benefits of the contractual agreement for the Brazilian 
SMEs.  
88 MDIC interview. 
89 See F. Cafaggi, L. F. J. Swensson, R.P. Macedo Junior, C. P. Gross, T.A. Silva, L. G. Almeida, T.A. Ribeiro, op. cit. 
90 The benefits of Grauna’s access to other GVCs were many and of great importance. The access to Pratt & Whitney GVC, 
for example, allowed Grauna to learn about new technologies and know-how. This new knowledge, not only allowed 
Grauna to have a product up-grade (to supply higher added value and complex components) but also an inter-sectorial 
upgrading. In fact, in this case, the Canadian company transferred to Grauna the technology necessary to deal with a 
nickel alloy. This transfer of technology allowed Grauna to produce for other sectors, such as for the petroleum 
industries, which also demand this kind of high technology. Another very important benefit of the company access to 
other GVCs is the diminished dependence on Embraer. The actual production output of Grauna can currently be divided 
as 65% to Embraer, 25% to Pratt & Whitney and 10% to other MNCs (such as ASCO from Belgium and FAAC from 
Austria) and to other economic sectors (such as the industry of petroleum and defense). See F. Cafaggi, L. F. J. 
Swensson, R.P. Macedo Junior, C. P. Gross, T.A. Silva, L. G. Almeida, T.A. Ribeiro, op. cit. 
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other activities co-ordinated by the network, were fundamental for the success of the company in 
accessing new GVCs. 
 
IV.5.  Analysis of HTA Difficulties and Quiescence 
Many causes contributed to undermine HTA’s aim of playing a more direct role as a direct contractor 
with the MNC and to its quiescence. In fact, although the HTA still formally exists, it no longer 
operates in practice. The causes range from external ones, such as (i) the end of the ApexBrasil 
Programme in 2009,91 which was considered to be one of the main causes of its quiescence, as, 
without the financial support of the agency, the cost of the consortium for its members doubled, 
becoming too high for some of its members, and (ii) the significant crisis that the entire sector has 
faced since the 2009 financial crisis, which led to breach of contracts, the reduction and suspension of 
product orders (such as those from EADS/CASA) and, together with the devaluation of the dollar 
which made Brazilian products more costly for international buyers, decreased the probability of 
achieving new international supply contracts and significantly reduced the revenues generated from 
those already in existence. 92 But they also comprise causes related to the regulation and governance of 
the HTA, in particular, from a law point of view, the inadequacy of the legal tools deployed to govern 
the network. 
The HTA experience is a significant example of the difficulties regarding the lack of a proper 
legal tool to regulate the hybrid form of organisation that characterises the contractual networks. 
In fact, the combination of non-profit association with a limited liability company, which is almost 
100 per cent owned by a non-profit association, formed by several limited liability companies, worked 
as a hindrance for the contractual relationship between the HTA and the MNC. 
Practice demonstrated that the MNC did not feel sufficiently secure in establishing a contract 
with a company formed essentially by a non-profit association, without any significant assets, and also 
without knowing at the outset the party who would effectively be responsible for the production of the 
components. 
Factors regarding its governance can also been pointed out. Being formed by SMEs that were 
engaged in competitive activities, the competition process for the sub-contracting mainly favoured 
enterprises with better structures and higher production capabilities, to the detriment of smaller ones, 
which became dissatisfied.93 
It is important to mention, however, that, despite the difficulties faced by the HTA and its 
actual quiescence, most of the public and private actors in the sector (such as the BNDES, the ABDI, 
MDIC, and HTA’s ex-president, and some of its members) believe that the network is a valid model. 
With some alterations to its governance structure, with the appropriate public support, and adequate 
legal framework, it could be an efficient instrument to facilitate the access of the Brazilian SMEs to 
new GVCs in the aeronautic sector.94 
In fact, the network model is still promoted by the Brazilian government through a new 
programme between ApexBrasil and CECOMPI (Competitiveness and Innovation Centre of the 
Northeast Region of São Paulo State), which has, as one of its main goals, the development of 
“collaborative networks” in order to allow the SMEs to supply a complete and more complex final 
product to MNCs and to acquire a better position within the GVC.95 
                                                      
91 His decision was a result of a restructuring of Brazilian agencies’ policies that, due also to resource problems, decided in 
all sectors of the economy to give priority to Integrated Sectorial Programs (PSI) of national range. Therefore 
partnerships with associations that represented entire sectors of the economy were prioritised. 
92 See F. Cafaggi, L. F. J. Swensson, R.P. Macedo Junior, C. P. Gross, T.A. Silva, L. G. Almeida, T.A. Ribeiro, op. cit. pp. 
38-39. 
93 MDIC interview.  
94 ABDI, MDIC, HTA interviews.  
95 ApexBrasil-CECOMPI’s PSI contract for 2011/2012. Currently, most of the HTA members participate in the CECOMPI 
programme with ApexBrasil, which undertakes some of the activities once performed by the HTA, such as participation 
in international fairs. 
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V.  Concluding Remarks 
Although the network phenomenon has existed as an economic reality for decades, it still poses many 
challenges to the law. The issues regarding its legal form and the instrument to regulate, or even 
locate, this complex phenomenon among the concepts of traditional law, is the subject of discussion 
among many international scholars. 
In fact, finding itself at the intersection between contract and organisation, none of these two 
traditional private law concepts are able, alone and in their traditional conception, to explain entirely, 
and adequately regulate, the different types of networks that are present in practice. 
The HTA is, in fact, an excellent example of these difficulties, which can also be found in the 
Brazilian legal system. In fact, although the network phenomenon is explicitly promoted by public 
programmes, the ApexBrasil project demonstrates the difficulties of finding an effective framework to 
regulate the inter-firm collaboration proposed. Despite the official name “export consortia”, the 
“consortia” was not the legal form chosen, but instead a “non-profit association”. 
The inadequacy of the choice, at least in the HTA case, is demonstrated by the network’s 
necessity to adopt a second legal structure to perform its activities, the limited liability company, 
which was also an operation performed in order to bypass the non-recognition of the single member 
company, at that time, by the Brazilian legal system. 
However, even the limited liability company did not turn out to be the best legal framework 
for the pursuit of HTA’s aims. In fact, practice demonstrates that the MNCs did not feel secure enough 
to conclude contracts with a company formed by a non-profit association, with no particular assets, 
without particular guarantees and without the possibility of knowing beforehand and assuring the 
liability of the individual enterprises effectively in charge of production. 
This can be attributed, in fact, to be one of the main causes of the partial failure of HTA as a 
direct contractor and in gaining direct access to GVCs. Nonetheless, it played a fundamental role in 
promoting the access of its associates. 
The HTA example demonstrates, on the one hand, the difficulties of the proper regulation of 
the network phenomenon, and also, on the other, the utility of the model, especially to allow SMEs to 
take advantage of the opportunity that the recent changes in the global production organisation had 
brought to a developing country, also represented by the access to new GVCs. 
These assertions lead us to affirm the urgency of the development of a proper legal framework 
for the network model, translated into the recognition of its hybrid characteristics and the consequent 
adaptation of the traditional contractual theory to encompass the particularities of the model.96 In 
developing countries such as Brazil, networks can play an important role in helping these countries to 
participate in the international market, in allowing its enterprises access to new GVCs, and, therefore, 
in taking advantage of the opportunities for development that it embraces. A proper legal framework 
for the network model, however, is fundamental for these achievements. 
  
                                                      
96  For a similar observation regarding the European context, see F. Cafaggi, Contractual Networks and the Small Business 
Act , op. cit.  
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2001 a sua articulação visando a construção da rede considerando que a criação de uma única marca
própria internacional que facilitaria a identificação e divulgação dos produtos nas diferentes missões
internacionais. Após a assinatura do contrato de venda a HTA solicita que a empresa produtora atenda
a encomenda. Desta forma, a marca vista pelos clientes é a HTA embora a produção seja feita pelas
diferentes empresas do grupo respeitando a área e atuação de cada uma delas17.
    Para o relacionamento comercial e estratégico com os clientes, a HTA estabelece um fluxo de
operação padrão conforme a Figura 1 ou variações que atendam as necessidades mútuas e o sucesso
da relação.
Figura 1. Principal Fluxo de Operação
Fonte: HTA - High Technology Aeronautics
    A HTA iniciou suas exportações no final de 2003 e vêm consolidando parcerias com destacadas
empresas do mercado mundial, refletindo diversos contratos com empresas como a Pratt & Whitney
Canadá, inicialmente no fornecimento de peças para suas turbinas, integrando assim um seleto grupo
de empresas com esta capacidade.
    Outro grande parceiro foi a EADS / CASA, Espanha, no fornecimento de peças estruturais para
aeronaves, inicialmente para um programa de off-set de fornecimento para o governo brasileiro. O
mecanismo offset facilitou a entrada no mercado espanhol, onde o Brasil comprou 10 aviões cargo na
Espanha e como compensação por 10 anos a Espanha vai comprar peças do consórcio18. Este acordo
de fornecimento envolve US$ 30 milhões durante dez anos, como resultado de acordo comercial
ocorrido quando o governo brasileiro comprou os aviões de carga C-295. (Damiani, Urbina e Cabral,
2004).
    Desde sua fundação, as empresas que compõem a rede têm marcado presença e consolidando sua
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